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2Throughout the 20th century, the United States has been heavily involved in the 
internal affairs of its Latin American neighbors. For a hundred years we have made their 
problems our problems and vice versa. There are many explanations as to why this 
relationship exists. Some see American policy motivated by a racist paternalism towards 
the South. Some see the hand of private capitalist interests guiding our policy. Some see a 
noble attempt to bring democracy to troubled and oppressed peoples. Finally, some see 
American policy motivated primarily by security concerns and the Monroe Doctrine, that 
is the belief that the United States should prevent powers from outside the Western 
Hemisphere from taking control over Latin American nations. I believe that the final 
rationale best explains our intense, but somewhat sporadic, fixation on Latin America. 
This paper will argue that American interventionism in Latin America has been 
motivated by security concerns and a desire to keep extra-hemispheric actors out of the 
Western Hemisphere. According to this hypothesis, the United States will primarily take 
interest in a Latin American nation when it is vulnerable to outside intervention. The 
main response of the United States will be to stabilize the situation and to make the 
nation strong enough to resist, or remove the need for, intervention by other actors. In this 
case stability, not democracy or economics, is the key. It would be expected that the 
United States would be unconcerned about democracy or freedom in  Latin America and 
would be willing to undermine these principles in the name of security. It would also be 
expected that interventions would not be spread out evenly over time, but instead 
concentrated around periods when an extra-hemispheric powers take an interest in Latin 
America or in a period of heightened world tension. 
The second explanation is that American interventionism has been motivated by a 
3desire to defend American capital and business interests in Latin America. This is the 
Marxist explanation, one of  public force in the service of private capital. In this case it
would be expected that the United States would intervene to overthrow governments that 
were economically nationalist and resistant to influence from Wall Street and replace 
them with puppets. The main purpose of the government would be to follow the interests 
of U.S. corporations and work to ensure profits for them. It would be expected that 
interventions would be evenly spread out through the 20th century and not concentrated 
during periods of world tension, since the fear of extra-hemispheric powers intervening 
would be merely a smokescreen for U.S. actions. It would also be expected of course that 
American corporations and Wall Street would be happy with U.S actions during this 
period.
The third explanation is that American interventionism has been motivated by a 
desire to spread the “gospel of democracy” throughout Latin America. According to this 
hypothesis, the United States intervenes to overthrow dictatorships and replaces them 
with liberal democratic regimes. It would be expected that America wouldn’t attempt to 
undermine democratic institutions such as free elections or a free press for the sake of 
stability or economic profit. Interventions would be concentrated at first to remove any 
existing dictatorships then spread out to overthrow dictatorships as they appear. It would 
be expected that the United States would not form alliances with authoritarian regimes 
and in no way would the United States move against a democratic nation.
In order to test these hypotheses I will examine several cases of American 
intervention that demonstrate a desire to seriously affect the internal workings of a Latin 
American nation. I will look only at interventions that were intended either to overthrow 
4an existing government, protect a existing government that was on the verge of collapse, 
or an intervention by which the United States took over some vital government function 
thereby impugning the sovereignty of that nation. I will not consider minor interventions 
that involve only a small number of U.S. personnel that could not have affected that inner 
workings of another nation. In this way I will exclude the many interventions that lasted 
only a few days and were only sent to defend American lives temporally. I will also 
exclude the actions of American corporations and individuals unless these actions were 
undertaken with the assistance of the federal government, or at the request of the federal 
government. This is because actions undertaken by rogue agents cannot seriously be 
considered policies undertaken by the American government and should not be examined 
as such. 
So what security concerns would the United States face with regards to Latin 
America? Although idea of foreign powers using Central America as a base to invade the 
United States via Mexico might make for interesting cinema, however it is not a realistic 
scenario. Central America’s importance to the United States comes from its proximity to 
the Panama Canal. There was a fear that enemies in Central America would go south and 
seize the canal, rather than move north.
The importance of Caribbean is a little more complicated. Aside from defending 
the approaches to the canal, other concerns worried U.S. policymakers. In the 19th century 
and the very early 20th century there were concerns that a European power could use 
Caribbean as a staging ground to attack the Atlantic Coast or blockade our ports. As the 
20th century progressed and America’s navy became stronger different concerns arose. 
America became concerned about defending its sea lines of communications with 
5Western Europe. Even with the Caribbean under American control, German U-Boats 
were still able to menace convoys to Britain during the World Wars.
In the Cold War the problem only increased. Besides needing to maintain control 
over the Caribbean, South America below the Amazon River became a concern. Germany 
had established a colony in Brazil during the Imperial Era and while this did not please 
the United States nothing was done about it. Now, with fear of the “domino effect” of 
communism, any penetration by the so-called foreign ideology might quickly spread 
throughout the hemisphere.
This paper is divided between two eras, What historian Peter Smith calls the 
Imperial Era of 1900 to 1933 and the Cold War Era from 1945 to 1992. At the start of 
each there will be a brief introduction and examination of the times in order to put 
American interventions in the proper perspective. The Imperial Era will start with a 
examination of American-German antagonism at the start of the century over Latin 
America. It will show how the German naval buildup, Kaiser Wilhelm’s speeches, and 
the Venezuelan blockade influenced the creation of interventionist policies with regards 
to Latin America. The Venezuelan blockade is a particularly important case since it 
involved the first major action by Europeans against a Latin American nation due to 
financial problems and ultimately led to the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 
in which the United States would pursue a policy designed to preempt any future actions 
by the Europeans in the Western Hemisphere.
For case studies of American intervention, this paper will examine intervention in 
the Dominican Republic in 1905, Cuba in 1906, Nicaragua in 1912 and 1925, and Haiti in 
1914. In each of these cases there was a massive U.S. intervention in which the American 
6government attempted to keep a regime in power or to take over sovereign powers of a 
regime. 
In 1905, it was clear that the Dominican debt default was going to draw 
intervention by Europe the same way that the Venezuelan default did three years earlier. 
This represents a good case of U.S. preemption of extra-hemispheric forces. It also 
represents a good case of the United States going against corporate interests as the 
relevant American company involved protested the intervention at first and the 
intervention in no way gave preference to this company. The two Nicaraguan 
interventions show how America ignored the crisis until it was clear that no sort of order 
could be preserved that could guarantee the safety of foreigners living in the country. It is 
worth noting that American intervention cleared the way for an economic nationalist to 
take power.  Cuba and Haiti show how the United States intervened when faced with the 
prospect of anarchy in each of those nations after their governments collapsed. In Cuba, 
fiscal stability and solvency was given preference over the possibility of  profits for 
American companies. 
However, in all of these cases, the United States stunted democracy in order to 
achieve stability. In Nicaragua, the conservatives were kept in power even though a 
majority of the country was liberal. In Cuba, conservatives committed frequent election 
fraud, driving the liberals to revolt. However, freedom and democracy were secondary 
issues in each American intervention during this era. 
The second part of the paper will start by explaining the transition from the Good 
Neighbor policy to the Cold War. It will look at the causes of America’s fear of 
Communist expansion into the Western Hemisphere, starting with the breakdown of the 
7wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States. It will show how the 
coup in Czechoslovakia and the Korean War shaped U.S. perceptions of the Communist 
threat. It will then focus on the cases studies of Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973, Central America in the 1980s, and Grenada 
in 1983.
In 1954, paranoia over Communist expansion was running at a fever pitch, and 
led America to overthrow the democratic government of Guatemala after previously 
tolerating years of economic reforms. In 1961, an exile invasion was launched to 
overthrow Castro in Cuba when the United States felt he was becoming too close to the 
Soviet Union. In 1965, the U.S. sent over 20,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to 
prevent the former president from retaking control of his country because he had support 
from the communists and the U.S. would not tolerate another Cuba. In 1973, the U.S. 
assisted and gave political support to a military coup against a democratically elected 
president because he was also a Marxist. In the 1980s America supported a brutal military 
regime in El Salvador because it was threatened by a communist guerrilla force, 
supported by Cuba, and tried to overthrow a left-wing regime in Nicaragua that also 
supported the rebels with arms shipments. Finally in 1983, the U.S. took advantage of 
chaos on the island of Grenada to rollback a Soviet-aligned state in the Western 
Hemisphere.
Understanding the historical background to American policy choices is crucial to 
understanding current policies and predicting future ones. If economics drives 
intervention then we can expect more interventions in the future as American investment 
increases due to globalization. However, if security drives intervention then we could 
8expect very little government interest in Latin America as long as the United States holds 
a commanding lead over any other potential competitors. Without a foreign power to be 
concerned about American policy would be aimless and drifting, following no consistent 
pattern.
9Part One: The Informal Empire
1900-1933
10
At the end of the 19th century most of Latin America had been free from European 
colonization for about 100 years. Since 1823, the United States had declared that the 
hemisphere was off limits to further colonization and exploitation by the Europeans, but 
for the most part the United States did not have the ability to back up this claim. However 
since Africa and Asia presented themselves as targets for imperialism throughout the 
1800s this wasn’t really a problem. Except for the brief occupation of Mexico in the 
1860s, the Monroe Doctrine was generally accepted by Europe. 
However, by the end of the century the rise of both America and Germany to great 
power status would make U.S. policy in the region much different in the 20th century than 
it had been in the 19th. Germany had been mostly shut out of expansion into Africa and 
Asia. Given the Kaiser’s desire for a German empire, America began to fear that he 
would pursue expansion into the Western Hemisphere. These fears were compounded by 
the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela in 1902 and by various German statements 
about their intentions for Latin America. The American reaction was to drastically change 
our Latin American policy, increase spending for the navy and to follow what was called 
the Roosevelt Corollary to prevent any future "Venezuelas". This Corollary would be the 
prime policy of the United States until the 1930s, when the absence of foreign interests in 
Latin America combined with a general state of stability in the region permitted the 
switch to a non-interventionist “Good Neighbor” policy. 
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American Policy in the 19th Century
Peter Smith cites two main motivations for imperialism, “To gain access to 
economic benefits…land, labor, and minerals; and second, to increase political strength 
and military capability.”1 American policy was mainly driven by the second 
consideration, increasing American power and denying power to others. As early as the 
beginning of the 19th century, the basis of U.S. policy was set, powerful extra-
hemispheric actors would not be allowed to gain and exploit footholds in Latin America. 
American policy was to encourage independence for Latin America, to tolerate a Spanish 
presence in the form of its colonies in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and to resist any attempts by 
Britain and France to move in at the expense of independent republics or Spain.2
American policy was dictated by the fact that Spain presented no threat to the United 
States, so its control would not threaten the interests of the United States. However, a 
more powerful nation, such as Britain, France or later Germany and the Soviet Union 
would.
On the North American continent, the American government was ready to use 
force to take control of vast tracts of land in what would become the modern United 
States, nearly coming to blows with France over New Orleans and outright seizing the 
Southwest from Mexico.3 However, after 1850, the United States stopped its military 
expansion, but still sought influence in the hemisphere. Although some in the government 
flirted with the idea of annexing Cuba, this was never officially endorsed by the 
government. Instead, America would embrace what would be called the “no-transfer 
1
   Smith, Peter H. Talons of the Eagle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 14.
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principle.” This stated that the U.S. would not tolerate Spain ceding any part of its Latin 
American Empire, specifically Cuba, to any other European power, e.g. Britain and 
France.4
By 1898 however, Spain’s weakness became a liability rather than an asset for 
American policymakers. On February 24, 1895, Cuban nationalists started their 
revolution against Spain. Later ,they released a manifesto demanding full independence 
(Cuba Libre) rather than just autonomy within a Spanish Empire. Spain sent over 100,000 
troops to crush the rebels, but instead found that the rebellion was more powerful then 
they anticipated. The war escalated and the total number of Spanish troops increased to 
200,000 by 1897. Still, Madrid was unable to achieve victory.5
Up until this point America had been neutral in the conflict and had offered to 
mediate a settlement to the war. President William McKinley had no love for war, but 
saw that if the current state of affairs continued Cuba would be utterly ruined. If Spain did 
manage to win, she would probably be to weakened to fight resist any other power which 
wanted Cuba, and if the Cubans won, they would also be in no position to enforce their 
own independent. The destruction of the USS Maine on February 15, 1898 provided the 
cause for war which was declared two months later. With the Spanish-American War, 
Spain lost the rest of her empire, including not only Cuba, but Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines as well.6
Washington wanted a canal in Panama and it wanted it to be under U.S. control. 
3
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4
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Without the Panama Canal, America would be unable to properly defend both its coats, 
since if ships were forced to sail around South America, Western Europe would be closer 
to the Pacific Coast than the U.S. Atlantic Coast was. A European fleet could actually 
beat the American fleet to California.7 Since American strategists considered this canal 
vital, control over Cuba would also be vital, and since Spain seemed too weak to hold it, 
America would seize it first. American policymakers plainly stated that the need for Cuba 
comes from a need to protect and control the future canal.8
However, securing the canal route would also involve direct U.S. intervention on 
the isthmus. Colombia had fallen into civil war in 1899, and American policymakers 
where still debating whether to build the canal in Panama or Nicaragua.9 Panama seemed 
to be the better site, but political instability in the area worried Washington. During the 
civil war, rebel forces attacked the rail line in the peninsula, which drew American 
intervention in 1902.10 Meanwhile, negotiations between the United States and Colombia 
over the future canal were collapsing. The Panamanian nationalists were furious over the 
failure of Bogotá to accommodate Washington.11 Up to this point they had feared 
rebelling against Bogotá due to concerns over American intervention, but when it became 
clear that they had a common interest in building the canal with Washington, they took 
their chance.12 In 1903, Panama rebelled against Colombia and was quickly assisted by 
7
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Washington, who was overjoyed that the valuable isthmus could be separated from the 
chronically unstable Colombia.13
America and Germany at the turn of the Century
After the Spanish-American War, U.S. policymakers began to worry about the 
possibility of Germany seeking bases or territory in the Western Hemisphere. Kaiser 
Wilhelm II had expressed his desire for expansion into Latin America, noting that, “we 
[Germany] must be the paramount power there [Latin America].” He also declared to 
King Edward VII of England that, “German naval construction is directed not against 
England, but America.”14 In addition, Germany, unlike other European powers such as the 
United Kingdom, explicitly rejected the Monroe Doctrine.15 Now, whether or not one 
takes these statements at face value, it must be noted that they had a profound effect on 
how American leaders viewed Germany. After the Germans continued their naval buildup 
by passing the Second Navy Bill in 1900, Secretary of War Elihu Root (who was to play a 
major role in American interventions in the Caribbean over the next several years) made a 
speech that predicted America would soon have to fight to uphold the Monroe Doctrine in 
order to keep Europe, and Germany in particular, from expanding further into Latin 
America.16
Many American leaders were skeptical that they could win a naval war against 
Germany as it was generally accepted that the German fleet was stronger than the U.S. 
13
 Smith, P., 35.
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Navy.17 The one trump card the United States had was that in the event of a war in the 
Caribbean the U.S. enjoyed a distinct geographical advantage. American naval bases were 
of course much closer to the expected war zone than German ones. The German war plan 
stated that a war would be fought somewhere in the Western Atlantic, near the Eastern 
Seaboard of the United States.18 The American counter-plan, code named “War Plan 
Black”, also anticipated a fight near the American coast.19
Both plans assumed U.S. control of the Caribbean, but also factored in a German 
takeover of an island base. For the Germans, seizing a base in the Caribbean would be 
crucial for any wintertime operations.20 Starting in 1898, German naval planners had 
begun searching for potential sites for a German Caribbean base, favoring the acquisition 
of Dutch possessions in the region.21  It is clear that a German presence in the Caribbean 
or elsewhere in Central America would tip the scales in favor of Germany in case of war. 
As a result, it became America’s policy to resist any such incursion into Latin America. 
Root would later claim that an American fear of Germany led to the government’s 
inclusion of the Platt Amendment into the Cuban constitution.22 No outright attempts 
were ever made by Germany to seize a base in Latin America. However, events in 
Venezuela convinced the American government that there might be indirect ways for the 
Europeans to gain a foothold in the Caribbean. 
It is worth noting that of the thirty military interventions undertaken by the United 
17
   Mitchell, 42.
18
   Herwig, 52
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   Mitchell, 55. 
20
   Herwig, 53. 
21
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States in Latin America between 1898 and 1938, twenty two were launched in the first 
twenty years (1898-1918, the period before the defeat of Imperial Germany) and only 
eight launched in the next twenty. An American intervention was almost three times as 
likely before the end of Imperial Germany then after, at least until the start of the Cold 
War. In addition, all but one of the major interventions discussed in this section took 
place in those first twenty years.23
Venezuela 1902-03
In 1901 Venezuela defaulted on its loans to various nations in Europe, primarily 
Germany, Italy, and Great Britain.24 This default led to an Anglo-German blockade and 
virtual state of war with Venezuela. This action and fear of its repetition would dominate 
the United States’ Latin America policy for the next twenty years. By the end of this 
crisis, Congress would approve the construction five new battleships to strengthen the 
U.S. Navy.25 This was not a one time buildup. Increased naval construction continued 
over the opposition of not only anti-imperialists and pacifists, but of the Wall Street 
establishment as well, as America tried to match the German Navy.26 It was also after the 
blockade that President Theodore Roosevelt would announce his corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine, fundamentally altering the government’s Latin American policy and providing 
the basis for American intervention in the affairs of the Caribbean nations. 
By 1902, Venezuela owed Germany in excess of $12 million for various reasons 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 25.
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ranging from investments and loans to damages incurred during a civil war around the 
turn of the century.27 Initially, the U.S. government did not mind a German show of force 
to collect the debt, as long as Germany guaranteed that it would not try to seize or annex 
any territory.28 However, when the blockade actually began in December 1902, things 
escalated quickly. 
On December 9 the Anglo-German coalition began attacking Venezuelan ships, 
sinking two. Four days later they attacked forts on the coastline.29 After the attacks 
America began to take notice of the situation. A memo written before the crisis 
emphasized the possibly of a slow escalation which would pull Germany deeper and 
deeper in as it sought further compensation for the war,  eventually leading to a German 
occupation of the entire country or at the very least the conversion of Venezuela into a 
German puppet state.30 Now, with Germany openly considering invading Venezuela’s 
ports and then destroying another fort on January 21, 1903, it seemed that if the situation 
continued, the quagmire that the memo predicted and the subsequent massive German 
intervention was inevitable.31 The U.S. Navy was deployed to the region to put diplomatic 
pressure on the Germans and to monitor their activities.32 An agreement was reached 
between all parties on February 14th and the Europeans lifted the blockade.33 A final 
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settlement of all debts was concluded a year later.34
However, the problems were still not solved. The court had decided that the 
blockading nations should be given “preferential treatment” in the payment of their debts. 
A State Department official was quoted as saying that the decision put “a premium on 
violence” when in came to collecting debts from other nations.35 In effect, the court was 
encouraging Europeans to use force to collect debts from an intransigent nation. By 
rewarding this behavior, it is not unreasonable to expect that Europeans would be more 
likely to use force in the future. This of course could lead to the scenario of a European 
state seizing control of a Latin American nation, either intentionally or through a slow 
process of escalation and reprisal. It would now become the policy of the United States to 
prevent this from happening by preventing the Europeans from even attempting to collect 
debts. The U.S. would assume the role of debt collector to make sure no other nation 
would.
Dominican Republic 1905-1924
In 1905 the United States assumed control of customhouses in the Dominican 
Republic in order to satisfy European creditors and prevent a reoccurrence of the 
Venezuela crisis of 1902. The United States would remain involved in Dominican politics 
until 1924, when marines were finally withdrawn. It has been charged that this 
intervention was undertaken for commercial and corporate reasons, not to preempt 
European intervention. However, the evidence suggests that security concerns and the 
34
   Munro, 74.
35
   Collin, 393.
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Monroe Doctrine were indeed behind the intervention. The American government 
remained aloof from the problems in the Dominican Republic until foreign intervention 
became almost inevitable. The suggestion that America intervened to protect democracy 
is also false, as the U.S. had no problem repressing democratic and liberal freedoms in the 
name of stability. 
Before the Venezuela blockade, the United States had expressed disinterest in the 
financial problems of the Dominican Republic. The San Domingo Improvement 
Company, a U.S. corporation set up to help modernize the Dominican Republic, only had 
access to the “good offices” of the State Department during its disputes with the 
Dominican Government in 1901.36 Secretary of State John Hay also rejected Dominican 
proposals in 1902 to lease bases in Samaná Bay and reprimanded the American Minister 
to the Dominican Republic, William Powell, for intervening too actively in the SDIC-
Dominican dispute in favor of the Company.37
It seems that if America had not been concerned about Europe becoming involved 
in the Dominican Republic as it had in Venezuela, American investors would have been 
left on their own to settle with the Dominican government. Twenty five years earlier, 
Assistant Secretary of State J.C. Bancroft Davis told Americans that sought to invest 
abroad that, “The citizen going to a foreign country does so with his eyes open and with 
full knowledge of the danger…which he incurs.”38 However, international events 
intruded, and so the United States pursued a policy in the Dominican Republic based on 
strategic security concerns. 
36
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Since about 1900 the Dominican Republic had been having problems with the 
Europeans. The French had once threatened a blockade over the murder of a French 
national and other European governments had applied pressure for various reasons from 
debt collection to protection of citizens living in the country.39 However, as late as 1904 
President Roosevelt had expressed a desire to remain somewhat uninvolved stating, 
“Their government has been bedeviling us to establish some kind of protectorate over the 
islands, [sic] and take charge of their finances. We have been answering them that we 
could not possibly go into the subject now at all.”40 America had no interest in taking over 
the Dominican Republic in order to expand the territory or reach of the United States. In 
addition, Roosevelt had no interest in intervening for the sake of the SDIC alone. Had the 
threat of European intervention been non-existent, it is likely that America would have 
left the Dominicans to their own devices.
However, a civil war had ravaged the nation and it seemed that it would be 
impossible for the country to pay its debts.41 A repeat of Venezuela seemed imminent. 
France and Belgium made it known that they were considering intervention after the 
Dominican Republic defaulted on its debts on November 1, 1904. Italy followed suit on 
December 24, announcing its intentions to intervene.42 In March an Italian warship 
arrived in the area to “inquire” about the Italian debts.43 A few days later the Belgians 
38
   Collin, 353.
39
   Munro, 87-88. 
40
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made another demand for payment.44 Roosevelt had proposed that America take over 
Dominican customhouses to ensure timely payment of debts as early as January 1905, 
however, the plan was held up in the Senate, which was reluctant for America to become 
involved.45 It took the threat of foreign intervention for Roosevelt to act, with or without 
Senate approval.46
In addition, the evidence suggests that the U.S. intervention was not taken at the 
behest of American corporate interests. It is worth noting that once the United States took 
over the customhouses American claims were treated the same as European claims, 
showing that the intervention did not favor only the United States, but was instead aimed 
at relieving all of the Dominican’s debts. Indeed, under the modus vivendi, as it was 
called, the SDIC lost a preferred position in debt repayment it had held previously.47
Debts were reexamined by the United States and in many cases reduced. In fact, many of 
the creditors actually opposed the American plan of assumption of the Dominican debt.48
The SDIC was especially hostile to the readjustments in debt and for a while there was 
mutual antagonism between the American government and the corporation.49 The SDIC 
eventually dropped its complaints once it realized that it could not dissuade the American 
government from pursuing the modus vivendi.50
However, the 1905 intervention did not bring permanent order and peace to the 
Dominican Republic. In November 1916 the United States launched a major military 
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intervention, setting up H.S. Knapp as military governor of the country.51 Dominican 
politics had not stabilized after the modus vivendi, with constant conflict between the 
central government in Santo Domingo and local strongmen or caudillos .52 Finally the 
tension became too great and civil war broke out in September 1913.53 The initial reaction 
from the Wilson administration was to push for a peaceful mediation of the dispute. The 
new American Minister, James Sullivan, was ordered to persuade the rebels to agree to a 
cease-fire and arbitration.54 However, attempts to end the conflict peacefully failed, and 
by 1916 the U.S. navy was routinely launching minor interventions to protect Americans 
and foreigners caught in the crossfire.55
Finally, a full intervention was launched. Its primary goal was to keep Desiderio 
Arias, the most powerful of the caudillos out of power. Arias was of particular concern to 
the United States, not simply because he was the most powerful caudillo, but because he 
was unashamedly pro-German, at time when war with the Kaiser was on the horizon.56 It 
is important to remember that even though Germany was then engaged in World War 
One, an allied victory was by no means certain, or even probable.57 The prospect of 
German influence in the Dominican Republic, via Arias and his fellow jimenistas,
weighed heavily on the minds of State Department officials, according to Herbert Stabler, 
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chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department at the time.58 Immediately 
after the occupation commenced, Knapp began censoring the press as well as personal 
correspondence, in addition he banned the private ownership of guns.59 This demonstrates 
that our intervention in 1916 was in no way an attempt to build democracy in the 
Dominican Republic, but an attempt to restore order and ensure stability. 
After America’s entry to the war and Germany’s defeat in 1918, the government 
began to reevaluate its Dominican policy. Plans to change the military government to a 
“provisional government” that was more democratic were proposed by the State 
Department.60 America however, continued its presence for a few more years, due to 
bureaucratic infighting and problems with transition negotiations with Dominican 
leaders.61 Nevertheless, it was clear that with the end of the German threat in Latin 
America, America’s interest in the problems of the Dominican Republic had fallen off 
considerably.  
Cuba 1906-1918
In 1906 the United States intervened in Cuba under the auspices of the Platt 
Amendment. Disputes between Liberals and Conservatives over the recent election had 
caused a collapse of the government. On September 29, Secretary of War, William 
Howard Taft took over the island as “Provisional Governor.”62 The 1906 intervention, as 
well as further involvement in Cuban politics, was an attempt to bring stability to the 
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island and prevent any occurrences which might draw in European powers. The collapse 
of government on the island in 1905 led to widespread anarchy and the possibility of a
destructive civil war. Europeans, afraid that their nationals might be targeted or at least 
put in jeopardy should this occur, began hinting at the possibly of intervention on their 
own if the United States did not move first.63
An interesting aspect of the American occupation of Cuba deals with the Ports 
Company contract. An American engineering firm, the Cuban Ports Company, was hired 
by the Cuban government to improve the infrastructure of the port of Havana. The 
contract was worth about $10,000,000.64 At first glance this appears to support the 
Marxist theory of American imperialism. The United States, controlling Cuba as a 
puppet, arranges for an American corporation to make millions “improving” the target 
country. Except for one thing, the federal government opposed the plan from the start. 
Secretary Knox stated that the contract was “a highly imprudent and dangerous fiscal 
policy which threatens to bring Cuba to a condition of national bankruptcy.”65  These are 
not the actions of a government in league with business. Instead it is consistent with the 
actions of nation concerned about stability in the Caribbean and familiar with the 
problems that fiscal insolvency can bring to the region.
Nicaragua 1912-1925
Instability was a fact of life for Central America at the beginning of the 20th
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Century. Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica had all been plagued with debt problems, 
and in 1901 Guatemala had drawn the ire of the Europeans over failing to make 
payments, leading to threats of armed intervention.66 Later, in 1907, when José Santos 
Zelaya, the president of Nicaragua, began supporting rebels in Honduras, the situation 
quickly escalated to full scale war, leading to the domination of Honduras by Nicaragua.67
American diplomats were able to help negotiate a peace treaty between all Central 
American states, committing the nations to a policy of peaceful coexistence.68 However 
continuing attempts by the republics to undermine each other via covert means continued 
with Nicaragua supporting rebels in El Salvador and countering moves by Guatemala and 
El Salvador against Nicaragua.69 Political chaos continued leading to civil war and the 
resignation of Zelaya in 1909.70 America had attempted to stay out of the fighting, but 
finally in 1912, President Taft ordered the first full scale armed intervention in Central 
America.71
America’s intervention in the Nicaraguan civil war had very little to do with either 
ideology or economics. First, the civil war itself was not an ideological fight, Liberals and 
Conservatives were little more that the names of factions from Leon and Granada 
respectively, and people fought for their region, not their beliefs.72 As a result, any 
intervention by the United States cannot be seen as an intervention either for or against a 
particular system of beliefs. Second, the United States had remained distant from the 
66
   Ibid., 143.
67
   Ibid., 147.
68
   Ibid., 152.
69
   Ibid., 155-6.
70
   Ibid., 179.
71
   Ibid., 215.
26
financial troubles American businessmen were having in Nicaragua, not intervening when 
Americans who had been granted special concessions by Zelaya had them revoked.73 In 
some cases America’s economic interests were divided, as some American nationals 
living in on the Atlantic Coast despised Zelaya’s economic policies, while the United 
Fruit Company had a heavy investment in some of Zelaya’s concessions.74 It is also worth 
noting that although Zelaya may have caused economic distress for American investors, 
the United States did nothing while he was in power. Indeed, our intervention in mid-
1912 postdates Zelaya’s fall by two and a half years. 
After the end of the 1909 civil war, the Nicaraguan government had offered itself 
as a protectorate to the United States, but the U.S. refused to commit, instead wishing to 
abide by earlier Central American treaties.75 In an attempt to preserve stability the 
American government proposed a custom receivership similar to the one that was, for the 
moment, working in the Dominican Republic.76 However, violence broke out again and 
the government of Nicaragua informed Washington that it would unable to properly 
protect the lives of Americans and other foreigners in the country.77 It was only then that 
American marines were landed in force to bring stability to the country and to protect the 
lives of non-combatants. The intervention of 1912 was mainly an attempt to defend 
American life and to assure the Europeans that their citizens’ lives would be protected as 
well. In addition, one must consider the proximity of Nicaragua to the Panama Canal 
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Zone, and any disorder in Nicaragua could easily spread given the history of Central 
American nations interfering in each others affairs. 
Once the United States became heavily involved in Nicaragua, its main goal was 
to promote stability, not democracy. The minority Conservatives would be allowed to 
govern even though the Liberals would probably have won any free and fair election.78
Democracy was pushed back so that the U.S. government could be sure of temporary 
stability and security. It would be the start of an unfortunate and tragic trend in American 
policy making for the rest of the century. This policy did not change even with the 
ostensibly pro-democracy, idealist President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson’s Secretary of 
State, William Jennings Bryan, considered Nicaragua vital to American national security 
and was willing to ignore democratic principles to ensure stability.79
However, even though democracy was not a prime motivation for the American 
government, neither was economics. There was tension between Wall Street and the 
Wilson Administration over terms of loans to Nicaragua.80 Emiliano Chamorro, who led 
Nicaragua under U.S. supervision and approval, was economic nationalist who verbally 
attacked American bankers for what he felt was excessive outside control. Later, 
according to Munro, Chamorro “threatened to seize the customhouses” in an attempt to 
intimidate U.S. finical interests in order to gain a leg up during loan negotiations.81
Clearly, Chamorro was no puppet of American corporate interests. Rather, he was a 
confident leader who provided what America wanted from Nicaragua, stability. 
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Haiti 1914-1934
Of all the Caribbean republics, Haiti had the most European influence at the start 
of the 20th century. Germany and France were heavily invested in the finances of the 
Haitian government, much to the concern of the United States.82 It became the policy of 
the American government to “keep Haiti’s finances out of German hands” and so 
Washington pressured Haiti only to deal with the United States.83 However, Franco-
German control was extensive. Haiti was primarily in debt to France and Germany, they 
controlled Haiti’s public utilities, in addition a majority of Haitian trade was carried on 
German ships.84 Given this large amount of penetration by Europeans it is not 
unreasonable to expect that they would intervene in case of any trouble on the island, 
although given the amount of influence the two powers held it might not take a crisis to 
bring Haiti firmly into a European nation’s sphere of influence. Secretary Bryan’s 
replacement, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, would later say that it was this desire to 
keep Germany out that drove America’s Haitian policy.85
Haiti had been racked by civil war and assassination in the first years of the 20th
century. There had been a civil war in 1902, which drew German intervention, coups in 
1908 and 1911, and finally another civil war erupted in 1913.86 By January 1914 rebels 
had seized customhouses and a general state of anarchy prevailed over the republic. 
America and Germany intervened militarily, with French and British forces arriving soon 
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after.87 However, this intervention merely protected nationals, and did nothing to stabilize 
the situation. Throughout 1914 things continued to get worse for Haiti. American plans to 
establish a Dominican style modus vivendi were frustrated by French and German 
insistence that they exercise control in tandem with the United States, a concession 
Washington was not willing to make. The State Department became concerned that 
German businessmen were gradually assuming political and financial control. Boaz Long, 
head of the Latin American Division, worried about an “ever present danger of German 
control” of Haiti.88
By October the government fell and any sense of order disappeared.89 By the 
summer of 1915 Foreign Legations were being attacked and violated, and on July 28, 
American Marines were landed to forestall an almost certain Anglo-French landing.90
Finally, on September 16, a treaty was approved by the American and Haitian 
governments that “legitimized” the occupation. While no territory was seized by the 
United States, a provision was included that prevented the Haitians from transferring 
territory to anyone else. In addition, Article 14 of the treaty echoed the Platt Amendment 
allowing the United States to “lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian 
independence.”91
It is important to note that American intervention came only after the French 
Legation was attacked, virtually guaranteeing a foreign intervention. It is also worth 
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noting the no-transfer principle imposed on Haiti. While the U.S. had no use for the naval 
station, or else we would have taken it, it might prove useful to a nation which had few or 
no bases in the region. Economic gain was certainly not a prime motivator for U.S. policy 
as, the American approved Haitian Constitution of 1918 contained restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land, despite the problems that would cause to American business interests, 
since it would also cause problems for Europeans seeking influence as well.92 Also, when 
the Haitian American Corporation, which was owned by capitalists in Chicago and 
Indianapolis, suffered setbacks in sugar production as well as problems with local 
officials the State Department at first refused to help leading to the company’s bankruptcy 
in 1921.93
Despite the end of the war in 1918, the American occupation would continue due 
to the progress that was being made and the somewhat amicable relations between Haiti 
and the United States through the 1920s. However, a violent rebellion in 1929, coupled 
with the lack of any foreign enemy to worry about during this period, led to plans for a 
complete American withdrawal, which was completed in 1934.94
Nicaragua 1927-1933
The 1927 intervention in Nicaragua is unique among the major interventions 
discussed in this section. By this time Imperial Germany had become the unstable 
Weimar Republic, which expressed no imperial ambitions. New arms control and peace 
treaties were being signed by all the major powers. The 1927 intervention occurred at a 
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lull in world tensions, yet security explanations still best explain America’s policy 
towards Nicaragua during this time. By 1924, America’s will to intervene had dropped 
considerably, making any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of a Latin American 
republic politically troublesome for U.S. policymakers.95 As a result, Washington began 
planning for the withdrawal of Marines, much to the disappointment and disapproval of 
Wall Street and corporate interests.96 However, banking and other capitalist interests were 
ignored by the government and withdrawal proceeded anyway, with Marines finally being 
withdrawn from Nicaragua on August 3, 1925.97
Peace and democracy did not come to Nicaragua after the withdrawal. Instead, 
Chamorro, having lost power in the 1924 presidential election, seized power from Carlos 
Solórzano, the legitimate president, in 1926. However, this coup brought no real response 
from the United States, making a mockery of the notion that the U.S. intervention had 
been launched to defend democratic government.98 Civil war broke out again, between the 
Chamorro regime and Liberals led by the usurped Solórzano’s Vice President, Juan B. 
Sacasa. The United States once again attempted to mediate as it had 20 years prior.99 It 
eventually recognized a compromise leader, Adolfo Diaz, as President.100 Unfortunately 
for the United States, Mexico recognized Sacasa as President instead, and the fight 
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carried on.101
As the chaos continued, U.S. forces were landed to defend Americans and other 
foreigners. However, these interventions were only to defend lives, not to affect the 
outcome of the civil war. In fact, President Calvin Coolidge telegraphed Admiral Julian 
Latimer, the commander of U.S. forces in the area, that his actions, “should be of local 
nature only and solely for the protection of Americans and foreigners. There should be 
nothing in the nature of intervention or interference with the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua.”102 In February 1927, a Platt-Amendment style arrangement was proposed by 
the Nicaraguan government, but this was rejected by the United States.103 Finally 
however, American efforts at mediation bore fruit, and in 1927 a general cease-fire was 
announced, based the promise that America would guarantee a free and fair election in 
1928. On May 12, the Liberals signed on to this agreement and all the major rebel leaders 
laid down their arms except one, the nationalist Augusto Sandino.104
At first Sandino was ignored by the Americans. As soon after the cease-fire was 
announced, the U.S. began withdrawing Marines from Nicaragua in anticipation of a 
general peace that would guarantee the safety of Americans and other foreigners living 
there.105 However, repots came in June that Sandino had taken to raiding American and 
European businesses, dismissing the hopes that foreigners would be safe without 
protection.106 With the prospect of European intervention returning if nothing was done 
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about the attacks, the U.S. sent the Marines after Sandino. Finally on July 16, the first 
battle between the Sandinistas and the Marines commenced, and battle continued the 
Marines pursued Sandino across the country.107 Now massive numbers of American 
troops would be sent to Nicaragua with the intent of putting down the Sandino rebellion 
and uphold the cease-fire.108
The intervention was now one to keep the fragile Nicaraguan government from 
falling; America was now involved in the civil war. It is important to note that the United 
States only became involved after Sandino began attacking foreigners and American 
Marines, showing that the action was one of preventing European reprisals against 
Nicaragua and also to avenge the death of U.S. servicemen. Economics certainly did not 
drive the intervention since the government of Nicaragua only owed Americans a little 
over $1,000,000 and American investment in Nicaragua was lower than in any other 
nation in Central America.109 Obviously it was not concern for U.S. capital that motivated 
the sending of thousands of marines, but rather a desire for stability and security for all 
foreigners living in the country.
The Good Neighbor
At the Montevideo Conference of 1933, America announced what appeared to be 
radical break with its past Latin American policy. The U.S. would formally renounce 
interventionism, declaring that, “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or 
external affairs of another.”110 This change was made possible by the fact that no hostile 
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foreign power could exercise any influence in Latin America at that time, which 
eliminated any security threat to the United States coming from that region. 
In addition America showed it was not willing to send in soldiers to combat to the 
forces of economic nationalism. In 1937, Bolivia expropriated American owned oil.111
Mexico also expropriated American owned oil companies in 1938. In both cases no 
attempts at military coercion were made.112 However, the U.S. did respond in kind with 
boycotts of Mexican oil, blocking loans to Bolivia and other forms of economic warfare. 
However, these policies where quickly abandoned when World War Two approached.113
In addition, during the early 1940s the U.S. gave Brazil aid to help it develop a domestic 
industrial capacity and accepted Venezuela’s demand that oil companies share half of 
their profits with Venezuela.114 These events show that in the absence of a extra-
hemispheric threat, the U.S. was not willing to resort to violence and military force to 
achieve its objectives in Latin America. 
Overall, U.S. policy during the Imperial Era was to make sure that it was 
dominant in the region in order to prevent any European powers from exercising 
influence. Interventions were undertaken to preempt possible European intervention, and 
when the chance arose America attempted to replace European influence in certain 
countries, such as Haiti. The primary concern for American policymakers during this era 
was Germany, which had declared a desire for empire. Other European nations were also 
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of concern, but not as great as Germany. 
With the end of World War One, the main rationale for intervention had 
disappeared, although American troops did stay in some Latin American countries past 
the end of war and into the 1920s. During this era control over the Caribbean was 
paramount, while events elsewhere in Latin America, such as German activities in Brazil 
were ignored, or at least not of great enough concern to draw a military response. After 
the disastrous intervention in Nicaragua in the 1920s and the absence of any foreign threat 
America felt confident enough to switch to a non-interventionist policy. However, this 
policy would only last as long as America felt secure in its hemisphere. With the 
reemergence of a foreign threat, coupled with what was seen as a foreign ideology, 
American intervention in Latin America returned.
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Part Two: The Cold War
1945-1992
37
With the end of the Imperial Era in international relations, President Franklin 
Roosevelt was free to renounce U.S. interventionism in Latin America. However, this 
would only last as long as American policymakers could be sure that no extra-
hemispheric power had an interest in Latin America. Until the outbreak of the Cold War, 
America pursued what was called the “Good Neighbor” policy, and no interventions were 
undertaken until 1954. However, once the Cold War started, America’s policy quickly 
shifted to one similar to that of the earlier Imperial Era. The U.S. would support friendly
dictators against what it saw as a the hostile, foreign, ideology of communism. During 
this era, human rights would take back seat to security as the U.S. gave aid to some of the 
most brutal regimes ever hold power in the Western Hemisphere. However, the United 
States was not inalterably opposed to reform either, supporting some friendly left-wing 
governments and reformist movements. However, at the first sign of Marxism, the U.S. 
would respond viciously. This would continue until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. 
Outbreak of the Cold War
The alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War 
Two had always been one of necessity and once the necessity of defeating Nazi Germany 
38
was eliminated, the alliance began to fall apart.115 Mutual distrust and hatred for each 
others systems of government would probably make any long-lasting cooperation 
impossible. Even during the war, the U.S. saw Soviet attempts to bring liberated countries 
into there sphere of influence as parts of the larger policy of aggression.116 Communists 
supported by the USSR had taken over Poland by early 1945.117 Later that year, President 
Harry Truman became concerned over Soviet attempts to intimidate Turkey into 
conceding bases along the Turkish straits, and Soviet troop concentrations in Northern 
Iran.118 However, for the most part these were traditional areas of Russian interest and 
Stalin had been willing to accede to American demands. As a result the United States was 
not overly concerned with Soviet expansionism just yet. Regarding Latin America, U.S. 
policymakers were not worried about fighting communism there as late as 1948, and 
some even expressed concern that some right-wing governments would use anti-
communism as an excuse to crackdown on all dissent.119 What would change the situation 
and convince U.S. policymakers that communism was indeed a threat world-wide, even 
in the Western Hemisphere, were two distant events, the communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Korean War in 1950. 
In 1948, Czechoslovakia was a free, democratic nation in which Communists had 
a plurality, but not a majority, in the national parliament. For a while it seemed that 
Marxists and non-Marxists  could co-exist peacefully in a coalition government. 
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However, this ended when Communist ministers saw their chance to consolidate power 
over the country. First, non-Communists were purged from government positions. Next 
after non-communist ministers resigned in protest, the remaining Communists seized 
power rather than hold new elections as was expected. Finally after gaining power, they 
began executing opponents of the regime.120 The lesson to American policymakers was 
clear, a government which contained Communists, even if they were a minority and in a 
democratic coalition, would be under threat falling to Communist dictatorship, which 
would then ally with the Soviets.
After the Second World War, Korea had been divided into two, North and South 
along the 38th parallel. The Soviets installed a communist government in the North, while 
the U.S. supported a right-wing government in the South. There had been an uneasy 
peace between the two Koreas, but that peace was broken on June 25, 1950 when 100,000 
North Korean soldiers, with tanks and other heavy weapons of war supplied by the 
Soviets attacked across the border in an attempt to forcefully annex the South. In 
America, this was seen as a proxy war, directed by Stalin in attempt to spread 
communism.121 This was the second lesson American policymakers, that once a 
government turned communist and allied to the Soviets, Moscow would try to use them 
to aggressively expand communism at the expense of the free world. With these two 
assumptions about the Soviets and communism in general, U.S. policy globally, and in 
Latin America especially, radically changed. 
Finally, a quick note on nuclear war. Smith points out that during the Cold War, 
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nuclear weapons had changed the way war and peace was conceived. Both nations had 
the ability to destroy each other, and this deterrence might create a situation where both 
sides, “found themselves locked in a nuclear standoff, accumulating arsenals they could 
never use.”122 If we accept this view of the Cold War, then ideas about security concerns 
seem rather absurd. After all, why would America care about Soviet bases in the Western 
Hemisphere, if war was impossible? However, to American policymakers, a Third World 
War was more complicated than simple mutual suicide. First, Americans were concerned 
that the Soviets did not see nuclear war in the same terms as they did. For a good part of 
the Cold War, the Soviets expressed a belief that they could win a nuclear war.123 It was 
feared that if the Soviets felt that the balance of power swung too far to their side, they 
could attempt general war against the West.124 There were also concerns over whether 
nuclear weapons would provide deterrence at all or whether a world leader could bring 
him or herself to use them.125 As such, American policymakers could not rely only nuclear 
weapons for security, but more traditional balance of power concerns that drove U.S. 
policy in the first part of the century.
A New Policy for Latin America
By 1950, the American foreign policy establishment had whipped itself into a  
state of panic over the Soviet Union. A classified memo, NSC-68  described the Soviets 
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as fanatics bent on world domination and committed to the destruction or enslavement of 
the Free World. It is worth noting that this document was not released to the public until 
25 years after it was written, so there is no reason to think it is a piece of propaganda 
meant for the public, but rather an honest assessment of how policymakers felt at the start 
of the Cold War.126 Key foreign policy adviser George Kennan was concerned about the 
possible balance of power shift if the Communists gained favor in a large portion of Latin 
America.127 Kennan recommended that the U.S. support any government that cracked 
down on Communists, no matter what means it used. While he hoped that democracy 
might be enough to fight off communists, he argued that the U.S. should support any 
means necessary to suppress them, including what he called, “harsh government measures 
of protection.”128 This was the intellectual beginning of America’s policy for the western 
hemisphere for the next 40 years. 
Congress began approving massive amounts of military aid for Latin America, 
allocating $38 million in 1951 and $51 million in 1952.129 The Eisenhower administration 
became concerned that Communists could exploit the growing unrest in the Third World, 
particularly in Latin America. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed a fear that 
“the Communists are trying to extend their form of despotism in this hemisphere.”130 In 
addition, the administration began an anti-Communist propaganda campaign in Latin 
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America, distributing comics, cartoons, and producing radio shows.131
However, President Dwight Eisenhower went beyond simple public relation 
programs, and began supporting various authoritarian regimes with military aid in order 
to guarantee that friendly governments would remain in power.132 Dulles summed up 
America’s policy when he said that he would prefer, “flourishing little democracies.” 
However he was willing to accept, “governments which contributed to a [sic] stability in 
the area were preferable to those which introduced instability…which would lead to 
Communist penetration.”133
Guatemala 1954
The new policy would first reveal itself it Guatemala, where the United States 
would launch its first major intervention since Nicaragua in 1927. Major economic 
reforms began in the late 1940s under President Arevalo, which were then continued by 
Jacobo Arbenz after his election in 1951. The centerpiece of Arbenz’s reform was a land 
redistribution program in 1952.134 However, the program drew the ire of the United Fruit 
corporation, which faced massive expropriations of its uncultivated property.135 Disputes 
arose over the compensation allotted for United Fruit. The company claimed it should be 
paid 75 dollars an acre, what it considered its true value, rather than the three dollars an 
acre it claimed when it paid its taxes.136
Despite this admission of gross tax fraud, the company had allies and support in 
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the Eisenhower administration, which was suspicious of people in the Guatemalan 
government. There were four communists in Arbenz’s government, although none were 
appointed to important positions. However, the U.S. still viewed Arbenz as a 
“Communist dupe or worse.”137 The smoking gun for those who believed this was the 
discovery on May 15, 1954 that Guatemala had received arms shipments from the Soviet 
bloc.138 Just over one month later on June 18, 1954, the U.S. backed an invasion of 
Guatemala by Colonel Carlos Armas to topple the Arbenz government.139
On the surface this is the strongest case in support of the Marxist theory of U.S. 
foreign policy. A reformist government, threatens the commercial interests of an 
American corporation, and so the U.S. reacts to put a pro-U.S. government back into 
power. Dulles himself admitted that there was no concrete evidence linking Arbenz to 
Moscow and the evidence that Guatemala was receiving Soviet arms is less shocking 
when one considers that the U.S. had thwarted their efforts to buy arms from other 
sources.140 The administration vigorously denied that it was acting on behalf of United 
Fruit, but should one believe it?141 There are a few facts that suggest that the intervention 
was undertaken because the government thought that there was a danger of communism 
in Guatemala and not for the sake of U.S. corporations. 
First, the U.S. had accepted economic reforms for years before the intervention, 
and had waited two years after the United Fruit expropriations to act. It was only after the 
arms shipment that the U.S. intervened, of course this just might have been the political 
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cover the government was looking for all along. Second, after the intervention the U.S. 
was very supportive of other reform regimes in Latin America. The U.S. gave millions of 
dollars in aid to the revolutionary government of Bolivia, which pursued similar reforms 
as Guatemala.142 In 1957, the U.S. government would give military aid to the democratic 
government of Costa Rica, which was involved in a war against Anastasio Somoza of 
Nicaragua. As Stephen Rabe points out, the U.S. was “assisting a acerbic critic of its 
Latin American policy and spurning Somoza, a long time ally.”143
However, the evidence does not conclusively point either way. There are those 
who will see it as a sincere effort to fight communist influence in the hemisphere and 
those who see it as a simple act of greed. It is impossible to know what was in the heart 
and mind of President Eisenhower when he gave the go ahead to overthrow Arbenz. Was 
he taken in by the hysteria of the era and did sincerely believe that Guatemala was a 
threat, or was he a stooge for United Fruit? 
Cuba 1961 
By the late 1950s, the Cold War mindset that had led to Arbenz’s overthrow had 
died down to some extent. Without fear of Communism penetrating Latin America, the 
United States felt free to encourage democracy in the region. Despite Secretary Dulles’ 
best efforts, by 1959 President Eisenhower was encouraging democracies over 
dictatorships. The effect was tangible as ten authoritarian governments fell in the late 
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1950s.144 For a time it seemed that Latin America would be removed as a theater of the 
Cold War, then Cuban revolution occurred.
In January 1959, a young radical named Fidel Castro came to power, as Fulgencio 
Batista, the dictator of Cuba, fled Havana.145 Batista had been overthrown by a broad-
based movement made up of Cubans from business owners to peasants who were tired of 
the dictator’s corrupt and incompetent rule.146 Although Batista had been a client of the 
U.S. for years, he was caught in the new pro-democracy policy of the late 1950s. The U.S. 
cut off all arms shipments in March 1958 and constantly pressured Batista to step down, 
finally abandoning him in December.147 American policymakers were somewhat wary of 
Castro leading Cuba after the revolution, but for the most part the U.S. would accept the 
new regime.148 In fact, the United States was the first country to recognize Castro’s 
government.149
However, some U.S. policymakers were suspicious of Castro from the start. The 
CIA felt that, “The Castro regime was moving more and more towards an outright 
dictatorship.”150 Almost immediately after naming himself Premier of Cuba, he purged 
moderates from the government and executed over 500 of Batista’s former supporters.151
As 1959 went on, Castro moved steadily towards the far-left on issues such as property 
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rights and the market economy.152 By the start of 1960, Castro identified himself with the 
Cuban Communist Party and purged all anti-communists from the main Cuban labor 
union, the Congress of the Revolutionary Confederation of Labor.153 He also purged many 
of his former allies, jailing some, while other fled to Florida.154
Starting in 1960, the Eisenhower administration began planning for removing 
Castro if it could not longer, “tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba.”155 By this time Castro 
had asked for aid from the Soviet Union, and expressed interest in an alliance.156
Relations between the U.S. and Cuba deteriorated quickly after that. The U.S. interpreted 
Castro’s hostility as evidence of Communist influence.157 As a result, the U.S. began to 
take measures against Cuba, starting with economic sanctions in the summer of 1960, 
targeting Cuba’s sugar exports to the United States.158 Unfortunately for the U.S. the 
result of this was to drive Castro closer to the Soviets, as Moscow quickly moved in to 
cover any economic losses suffered by Havana. In addition, Castro retaliated further by 
seizing the remaining American property in Cuba.159 In essence, Eisenhower’s policy cost 
American capitalists around $900 million, as they lost all their investments. 
As 1960 wore on, it became clear that Moscow considered its new found ally a 
valuable asset, and one it was willing to defend with nuclear weapons. Three days after 
Eisenhower cut Cuban sugar exports to the United States, Soviet leader Nikita 
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Khrushchev gave a speech in Moscow in which he stated that the Soviet Union could 
“support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon 
dare launch an intervention against Cuba.”160 On October 19, 1960, the U.S. ended all 
trade with Cuba, beginning the controversial policy that continues to this day.161 Finally 
on January 3, 1961, President Eisenhower severed all diplomatic relations with Cuba.162
President John F. Kennedy came to office with many of the same perceptions as 
Eisenhower did. Kennedy saw a “full-scale Latin American Cold War” and believed that 
Castro must be dealt with.163 For Kennedy, Cuba was just another front in the Cold War, 
no different that Western Europe or Southeast Asia.164 Reports surfaced of Soviet arms 
shipment to Castro and of Cubans being sent back to Eastern Europe for training in a 
Soviet version of the School of the Americas. As a result, time was not America’s side.165
With Castro becoming more secure in Cuba, and becoming closer to the Soviets 
everyday, Kennedy made the decision to act quickly, and the CIA launched its proxy 
invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961, in the now infamous Bay of Pigs.166
In two years American policy towards Cuba went from acceptance of Castro’s 
rule, to a covert invasion to remove him. It is apparent that it was his perceived and then 
actual ties to the Soviet Union that caused this hostility. The first American moves 
against Castro predate his total expropriation of American property, and in fact may have 
precipitated it, costing American investors almost a billion dollars. Although a plan to 
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topple Castro was in the works almost immediately after he took power, it took concerns 
over Soviet aid and Khrushchev’s speech to trigger the ill-fated Bay of Pigs. 
Dominican Republic 1965
After Castro took power, the United States realized that Latin America was not as 
stable as it had previously hoped, and the threat that Communism posed seemed more 
acute than ever. America continued the late 1950s policy of trying to befriend 
democracies and shunning or even moving against what were perceived as unstable right-
wing autocracies. In 1960 Eisenhower announced the creation of the Social Progress 
Trust Fund, which would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to help raise the 
standard of living in Latin America. It was hoped that this would help prevent the 
extremism that fueled Marxist sympathies among poor Latin Americans.167 Eisenhower 
also tried to mend fences with leftist leaders, including the radical President of 
Venezuela, Romulo Betancourt, who had previously denounced American influence in 
the Venezuelan economy.168 Of course, old habits die hard, and included in this wave of 
embracing Latin America was about $400 million in military aid, primarily meant to fight 
insurgency.169 However, at least publicly Eisenhower championed peaceful change in the 
hemisphere, encouraging “a more equitable distribution of national income…and through 
peaceful means rather than violent.”170
Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic was the first tyrant to fall 
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under this new policy. Trujillo had long been an ally of the United States. After he seized 
power in 1930, America quickly recognized him and established relations.171 He 
cooperated with the United States against the Axis in World War Two.172 However, soon 
after the end of the war, special treatment for him and aid to the Dominican Republic was 
cut off.173 When the Cold War began, Trujillo saw his chance and became a passionate 
anti-Communist in order to gain U.S. favor again.174 His plan worked, and aid to the 
Dominican Republic increased drastically during the 1950s.175
However, the Cuban revolution had forced the U.S. to reconsider its partnerships 
with dictators in Latin America. Eisenhower was concerned that Trujillo’s rule was 
creating the same kind of anti-American and pro-Marxist extremism that led to Castro.176
Later, Trujillo was implicated in the death of an American citizen, Charles Murphy, 
which embarrassed and infuriated the Eisenhower administration.177 Around the same 
time the U.S. began plotting against Castro, plans were drawn up to intervene in the 
Dominican Republic, if Trujillo’s reckless actions led to a Communist revolt.178 Finally, 
Trujillo began a covert war against Venezuela, aiding an failed military coup in April 
1960, and attempting to assassinate President Betancourt in June.179 By now, Eisenhower 
was fed up with Trujillo and his antics and the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with the 
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Dominican Republic on August 26, 1960.180 The U.S. enacted sanctions against Trujillo in 
January 1961, with Latin American support.181 This lack of support probably doomed the 
dictator, who was killed on May 30, 1961.182
After Trujillo’s death, the United States was left without a policy in Dominican 
Republic. Anarchy gripped the country until the election of Juan Bosch in December 
1962. The U.S. embraced the new democratic government, and it seemed like things 
might work out after all.183 However, a familiar pattern reasserted itself, and Bosch was 
overthrown within a year. The coup leaders called themselves the “Triumvirate” and were 
recognized as the government of the Dominican Republic by the United States on 
December 14, 1963.184 It was hoped that the Triumvirate would bring stability and 
democracy might someday be restored.
However, the coup failed to bring peace to the country. Militant far leftists had 
opposed the Triumvirate from the start, launching a guerrilla war in October 1963, and 
continued resistance until 1965. The left was disorganized, but had a common goal, the 
overthrow of the Triumvirate.185 This of course led the U.S. to support the government, 
particularly the pro-American Reid Cabral, who had been opposed to Trujillo and 
appeared to be a competent and forceful leader, one who could stabilize the situation.186
Nevertheless, the Dominicans failed to share the American Government’s infatuation 
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with Cabral, who had managed to alienate both the left, right, and just about every one in 
between. Public opinion surveys showed that he the support of around five percent of the 
nation.187 In fact, Reid was so disliked, that on April 24, 1965 he was overthrown by the 
Army, who now supported Bosch, the man they had overthrown almost two years 
earlier.188 Unfortunately for Bosch, although he now had the support of the Army, he also 
was supported by the Communists and other leftists, which drew the ire of the United 
States.189
At first the United States felt that Bosch did not have enough support to lead the 
Dominican Republic. It was believed instead that a provisional junta would take power 
instead.190 However, the military could not agree on who should lead, and the junta failed 
to form, instead leaving the Dominican Republic in state of civil war as pro and anti-
Bosch military forces battled for control.191 America became concerned about a Bosch 
regime, supported by the Left, coming to power, but held off any intervention due to the 
belief that anti-Bosch forces would win the day.192 As the battle wore on though, The 
United States became less confident about this, and on April 26, the Caribbean Ready 
Squadron, comprised of about 1800 men, was standing by in case an intervention was 
ordered.193
The first landing occurred on April 28, with President Lyndon Johnson initially 
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ordering 500 Marines into the Dominican Republic.194 However, it appeared that this 
would not be enough. On April 29 the anti-Bosch junta had basically been beaten and the 
pro-Bosch rebels victorious.195 The belief in Washington was that this meant a “pro-
Communist government,” and the 82nd Airborne was readied for action.196 By the first 
week of May, about 23,000 soldiers were sent to the Dominican Republic.197 Their orders 
were simple. As General Earl Wheeler explained it to a subordinate, “Your unstated 
mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist. The President had 
stated that he will not allow another Cuba.”198
Concerns over security drove American policy in the Dominican Republic during 
this era. The United States had no problem supporting Trujillo when he was opposed to 
the Axis, or supporting the U.S. in the Cold War, but Washington turned on him when he 
became a security risk instead of an asset. In no way did the U.S. care about democracy in 
the country as although the U.S. initially supported Bosch when he was elected, 
policymakers just as quickly supported the Triumvirate when they came to power. The 
main goal was to support any regime which could provide stability. Finally, it was the 
prospect of another “Cuba” that drove the U.S. to send over 20,000 troops to prevent this 
from happening. In many ways this was similar to the 1916 intervention, when U.S. 
forces were landed to prevent the supposedly pro-German Arias from coming to power.
Chile 1973
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When Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency in 1963 after President Kennedy’s 
death he quickly turned from the previous pro-democracy policy of Kennedy and 
Eisenhower and towards a more old-fashioned pragmatic one. The U.S. would return to 
funding and supporting any anti-communist government, with a blind eye towards their 
human rights policies. The greatest examples of this new policy, which would be called 
the Mann Doctrine after assistant secretary of state for economic affairs Thomas C. 
Mann, would be Brazil, where America supported a right-wing military government 
which seized power in 1964 and in Chile where a left-wing government was overthrown 
in 1973.199
During World War Two, Chile received substantial aid as a reward for breaking 
with the Axis powers and aiding the American war effort.200 After the Cuban Revolution, 
Chile was chosen to be the model for America’s new program of promoting democratic 
peaceful reforms rather than violent revolution. The United States encouraged land 
reform as a way to head off any Marxists coming to power either through violence or the 
ballot box.201
However, more traditional methods were also used to combat the Left, as the U.S. 
sent about $25 million in military aid to Chile in 1963 and also helped train 
counterinsurgency officers in the United States.202 The CIA also became involved, 
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supporting various right-wing and moderate parties.203 In 1964, the CIA sent around $3 
million to the centrist Eduardo Frei in his campaign against the socialist Salvador 
Allende.204 This support, along with a center-right alliance against the left contributed to 
Frei’s victory with 56 percent of the vote compared to Allende’s 39 percent.205 Frei 
carried out some reforms of the economy, and it seemed that Chile would continue to be a 
stable ally of the U.S.206 However, things began to radically change as the 1970 election 
approached.
In 1967 the Socialist party formally embraced Marxism declaring that, 
“revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate,” and that “peaceful and legal reforms 
are limited instruments…which lead to armed struggle.”207 Given this, the CIA increased 
its efforts in Chile to prevent this new overtly Marxist socialism form coming to power. 
The CIA sent $350,000 to affect legislative elections in 1969. The CIA also supported 
left-wing groups which disagreed with the new path the Socialists were taking. Overall, 
the CIA carried out 20 covert operations in Chile between 1964 and 1970.208 However, 
this proved to be ineffective as the center-right coalition collapsed in 1970, leading to a 
split of the anti-Marxist vote, with the right-wing Jorge Alessandri winning 34.9%, 
centrist Radomiro Tomic winning 27.8% and Socialist Allende winning 36.1%.209 For all 
the CIA’s efforts, for the first time a Marxist government had been freely elected.
Almost immediately after, the U.S. government began considering measures to 
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prevent Allende from taking office. It was believed by U.S. policymakers that Allende’s 
win had been financed by Cuba and the Soviet Union.210 As such, concerns about 
democracy in Chile were put aside by the government as trivial compared to the threat of 
a Soviet puppet ruling in South America. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger 
considered the Chilean voters “irresponsible” for voting in Allende in the first place, so 
the U.S. should not be concerned about subverting a fellow democracy.211 The first plan 
was to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency by having the military call new 
elections. At the same time the U.S. would pursue a policy of economic warfare design to 
“make the economy scream.”212
Mostly however, U.S. policy was designed to encourage a coup against Allende. 
Attempts to keep Allende out of the presidency failed, and resulted in the death of one of 
Chile’s top generals, Rene Schneider, who had opposed the plan.213 After Allende was 
inaugurated, the CIA began funding the opposition, giving over $1 million to anti-
Allende media outlets.214 Concern over Chile rose in September 1971 when Allende 
began expropriating American companies and charged the companies for their activities 
in Chile, demanding that the Anaconda Company pay $78 million and Kennecott $310 
million.215 However, it would still be another two years before the coup.
Reports surfaced in early 1972 that Chile was receiving arms from Cuba, a charge 
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which reinforced American perceptions of Cuban and Soviet influence over Allende.216
American economic warfare continued into 1972, with the U.S. attempting to block credit 
and aid to Chile, but this measure did not prove effective.217 In October 1972, Chilean 
truckers went on strike in protest of Allende’s economic and political policy. This strike 
quickly spread to other sectors of the economy.218 It was widely suspected that CIA helped 
fund this strike.219
As the 1973 legislative elections rolled around, it was clear that the government 
was beginning to lose popular support, with the pro-government vote dropping from 
around 50% in 1971 to 44% in 1973. The unified opposition received about 56%.220 The 
political situation deteriorated into the summer of 1973, with a failed army insurrection in 
June. Also that summer, the left had taken control of the television stations, and it was 
thought that Leftists were organizing and arming into a paramilitary force outside the 
control of the regular armed forces. Right-wing forces began a series of bombings, and in 
July, truckers went back on strike.221 Finally, Chilean democracy collapsed when the 
Army overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973.222
So what was the U.S. role in all this? Clearly America contributed to the 
conditions which led to the coup, with its policy of economic warfare. However, the U.S. 
role in this event was not nearly as clear as other interventions, such as the Guatemalan 
coup, the Bay of Pigs, or the Invasion of the Dominican Republic. It is clear however, that 
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American supported reform efforts by the Frei government before Allende, and hostility 
to Allende, “antedated any hostile action,” taken by him.223 Overall, it is unclear how long 
the U.S. would have refrained from any overt action such as in Guatemala or the 
Dominican Republic if General Augusto Pinochet had not overthrown the government 
himself.
Nicaragua 1977-1990
As the 1970s continued it seemed like a shift had occurred in global politics. 
Détente had taken hold, and it seemed that a new era of understanding between the 
United States and the Soviet Union had arrived. President Richard Nixon’s visit to 
Beijing and Moscow led one overly optimistic historian to declare in 1974, “The cold war 
was over, ended in large part through the efforts of an American President who had been 
one the resolute cold-warriors.”224 President Jimmy Carter had declared that “fear of 
communism” would no longer dictate American foreign policy.225 In 1977 he cut off 
economic and military aid due to dictator Anastasio Somoza’s human rights abuses. 
Without this aid, his opponents felt free to rise up and in October the FSLN (Sandinista 
National Liberation Front) began attacking government installations.226 By 1978 a broad-
based movement had formed against Somoza.227 The U.S. did not come to Somoza’s 
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rescue, as Carter did not want U.S. forces to be used to prop up a brutal dictator. After 
Somoza refused mediation of the civil war, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Nicaragua 
in January 1979.228 Without the support of the United States, Somoza was doomed. The 
FSLN took over on July 19, 1979.229
Most U.S. policymakers had few problems with letting Somoza fall, however 
some were concerned about the FSLN taking over. The FSLN had been supplied by the 
Cubans since the 1960s, and to some that meant that Castro would be following the FSLN 
into Managua.230 To them, détente was failing, the Soviets had not been sincere in their 
desire for peaceful co-existence. Cuban/Soviet interventions in Angola in 1975 and 
Ethiopia in 1978 as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 proved to some 
policymakers that the Soviets still harbored expansionist desires.231 In addition, the 
“discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba” alarmed those suspicious of Soviet 
intentions in the world.232
Despite this, the U.S. at first tried to keep good relations with the FSLN. The U.S. 
sent around $10 million in aid  to help refugees of the war. In September 1979, about $8.5 
million in economic aid was sent. For 1980, $75 million in aid was budgeted for 
Nicaragua.233 However, relations between Washington and Managua would deteriorate 
quickly after reports of Nicaraguan involvement in the civil war in El Salvador. 
Intelligence indicated that the FSLN was aiding the FMLN (Farabundo Marti Front for 
228
  Arnson, Cynthia J. Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America 1976-
1993 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 33.
229
  Ibid., 35.
230
  Ibid., 15.
231
  LeoGrande, 53.
232
  Arnson, 37.
59
National Liberation) with arms shipments.234 The CIA reported that it found a “very high 
likelihood that training and weapons support for the Salvadoran insurgents was occurring 
and represented official FSLN policy.”235 It was because of this support by the FSLN that 
Carter suspended aid in early 1981.236
When Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981 he faced a choice on whether to cut 
off aid to Nicaragua entirely, or to try and work with the FSLN. At first, he chose the 
latter.237 It seemed as though a diplomatic solution might be possible, as the FSLN 
admitted to working with the FMLN in the past, but pledged not to in the future.238
However, many in the Reagan administration refused to believe this, and they argued for 
a complete cut off, against the wishes of the more moderate advisers. In the end, distrust 
carried the day, and Reagan chose to permanently cut off aid to the FSLN, which of 
course led to promises of massive aid from the Soviet bloc.239 Almost immediately, the 
U.S. began working on another invisible blockade by attempting to “strangle” the 
Nicaraguan economy.240 However, it would not be just simple economic warfare like in 
Chile. This time the government would revisit the strategy that had worked in Guatemala 
and finance a covert exile army, known as the “Contras” to fight the FSLN.241
The Contra War continued throughout Reagan’s presidency, and investigations 
233
  LeoGrande, 30.
234
  Ibid., 31. 
235
  Arnson, 49.
236
  Ibid., 51.
237
  LeoGrande, 105.
238
  Ibid., 106.
239
  Ibid., 107-108.
240
  Ibid., 110.
241
  Ibid., 111.
60
over his conduct of the war nearly led to his impeachment.242 All attempts at negotiations 
during his term had failed, it seemed that it would take a new president, and shift in the 
global political climate to end the war. 1989 would bring both. President George H.W. 
Bush approved cuts in aid to Contras on March 24, 1989, and would later support the 
Central American peace accords which the Reagan administration had resisted.243
Elections were held in 1990 between the FSLN and the opposition party, UNO ( National 
Opposition Union). The U.S. would give around $9 million in aid to election, a large part 
going to UNO.244 This aid, along with many other factors, led to the victory of Violeta 
Chamorro of UNO over Daniel Ortega and the FSLN on February 25, 1990.245 With this, 
the Contra War ended. 
America at first tried to work with the FSLN, with Carter promising almost $100 
million in aid in 1979. However, hostility was trigged by FSLN support for the FMLN in 
El Salvador, which convinced many U.S. policy makers that the FSLN was dedicated to 
spreading revolution and could not be trusted. Clearly America, or at least the Carter 
administration, was not irrevocably hostile to reform, it was only when they thought that 
the FSLN was spreading revolution did they move against them. 
El Salvador 1979-1992
The U.S. support for the authoritarian government of El Salvador was closely 
linked with the rise of the FSLN in Nicaragua. El Salvador had been under the control of 
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a military dictatorship for decades before the 1970s.246 They had received moderate 
amounts of aid during their reign, but in 1977 they rejected American aid rather than 
submit to Carter’s policy of inspecting the human rights situation in El Salvador.247 On 
October 15, 1979 a reformist coup overthrew the regime, and promised to correct the 
worst elements of the old guard.248 The new junta wanted to bring in representatives of the 
left, something that alarmed the United States.249 However, these plans fell through and 
leftist guerrillas continued the fight against the government.250 In 1980, aid, albeit non-
lethal aid, was restored to El Salvador.251
Throughout 1980, the Salvadoran government began moving back towards the 
right, while leftist guerrillas began coordinating forces, uniting into the FMLN, the group 
that the FSLN was supporting.252 The FMLN, sensing that the U.S. was becoming more 
and more supportive of fighting leftists worldwide as détente collapsed, prepared a final 
offensive to take over El Salvador before the U.S. could react. The FMLN received arms 
shipments from the Cubans, via Nicaragua in late 1980.253 This move effectively ended 
the debate in the U.S. over whether to support the Salvadoran regime or not. Carter lifted 
the ban on lethal aid, and $5.9 million was sent on January 14, 1981.254 When Reagan was 
inaugurated the floodgates were opened. On February 27, $25 million in military aid was 
sent. In addition, the amount of U.S. advisers would be doubled. Covert operations would 
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receive $19.5 million to perform political and paramilitary operations in El Salvador.255
America was now fully committed to propping up the Salvadoran regime.
As with Nicaragua, changes only came with President Bush and the new world 
order that was prevailing. In January 1989, the Administration pressured the Salvadoran 
government to negotiate with the FMLN to bring them into the elections that were 
scheduled for that year.256 The negotiations failed and  the right-wing party, ARENA 
(Nationalist Republican Alliance) won the elections without significant opposition. 
However, U.S. pressure began to sink in.  In September, ARENA officials met with the 
FMLN in Mexico City. Peace talks continued off and on until October 31, when a bomb 
attack on a leftist trade union derailed talks.257
Despite this setback, it was clear that the old Cold War rules that had been laid 
down by Kennan 50 years prior no longer applied. Calls to support El Salvador despite 
massive human rights violations to prevent a communist takeover no longer convinced 
many in the United States. With the threat of aid being cut off, ARENA and the FMLN 
met again in April 1990. In the U.S., the House of Representatives  voted to cut military 
aid to El Salvador in half on May 22, 1990.258 The Senate would agree on October 19 and 
Bush would sign the bill on November 5.259 By June 27, 1991 only non-lethal aid would 
be sent.260 Finally, the government and the FMLN would sign a cease-fire on January 16, 
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1992.261
The involvement of the United States in the Salvadoran civil war clearly shows 
that America was not concerned about democracy in it’s Latin America policy, as 
massive amounts of aid were given to a brutal dictatorship that was murdering its own 
people. However, the close relationship between that end of the Cold War, and the cut off 
in U.S. aid show that Cold War fears prompted the intervention, and when that was 
removed, so was the rationale for aid. 
Grenada 1983
The last Cold War intervention was the invasion of Grenada by the United States 
in 1983. On March 13, 1979, Maurice Bishop of the NJM (New Jewel Movement) 
overthrew the dictator Sir Eric Gairy. From 1979 until October 1983 Bishop drew very 
little attention to himself and to Grenada.262 Carter had no love for the Gairy 
administration, and made no attempt to try an save his regime Once in office, Bishop 
quickly consolidated power, arresting political opponents, closing newspapers, and 
suspending civil liberties.263 Grenada had some military and political connections with the 
Soviet Union, including Cuban assistance on an airport.264 The runway would be about 
10,000 feet, suitable for commercial airliners, its stated purpose, but American military 
planners also claimed it could be used by Soviet bombers as well. Also disturbing to 
American officials, was Grenada joining with Cuba in supporting the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan at the United Nations, while other non-aligned nations had either condemned 
261
  Ibid., 263.
262
  Beck, Robert J. The Grenada Invasion (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 11.
263
 Ibid., 25.
264
  Ibid., 12.
64
the Soviets or abstained.265 Some U.S. economic and political pressure was applied to 
Grenada, but for the most part it was ignored.266
 However, by October 1983, economic recession had thrown the nation into 
political anarchy.267 The turmoil culminated on October 13, 1983 when Bishop was 
overthrown by an internal coup launched by a rogue faction within the PRG (People’s 
Revolutionary Government).268 On October 15, plans were made by the U.S. to try and 
rescue Bishop and fly him off the island, but nothing came of it.269 The main fear for the 
United States was that if Bishop was harmed or continued to be in jeopardy , Cuba might 
try to intervene to save their ally. It was also possible that Bishop might reciprocate by 
being more friendly to the U.S.270 When it became apparent that Bishop had been killed, 
overt intervention became the top choice. The rescue of Americans on the island would 
provide a suitable excuse for the invasion, and America would get to rollback a Soviet-
aligned state.271 Finally, America seized its chance and invaded Grenada with 1,900 
troops on October 25.272 The action drew massive criticism from the rest of the world, but 
by 1984 a moderate government had been installed, and Grenada was back squarely in the 
Western camp.273
Grenada had been nominally aligned with the Soviets for few years before the 
invasion, and it never had posed an acute enough threat to warrant an invasion before 
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1983. Carter made no attempt to stop Bishop’s revolution, and it was not a major concern 
of the Reagan administration. This shows that it must have been something in October 
that triggered the invasion. Most likely, Reagan saw his chance to weaken Soviet/Cuban 
influence in the hemisphere and he took it. Grenada was in chaos, and there was the 
potential that Cuba might intervene and take control, but more likely the chaos made 
Grenada an easy target. 
There is also a theory that says Reagan invaded Grenada in response to the 
bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut, that Reagan wanted to send a message of U.S. 
dominance after the defeat in Lebanon. However, this is unlikely. Although the invasion 
did take place two days after the bombing,274 planning for the invasion had taken place 
days before, and the Task Force that would perform the invasion was sent towards 
Grenada three days before the attack on October 20.275 While the attack undoubtedly 
affected Reagan, the invasion of Grenada was a priority before that.
Overall, U.S. policy during the Cold War was to prevent communism from 
spreading into the  Western Hemisphere. U.S. policymakers were concerned that once a 
state went communist it would align itself with the Soviet Union and begin spreading 
revolution elsewhere in the region. As a result, it became American policy to oppose any 
movement affiliated with the communists and to support any government, no matter how 
brutal, that opposed communism. 
On November 11, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, and soon after the Cold War 
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suddenly ended.276 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States faced no other 
great power that could match or even challenge them militarily. For the first time ever in 
American history, the U.S. did not have to worry about the militaries of foreign powers. 
American policy worldwide lost its focus during the 1990s, and its Latin American policy 
was no exception. We entered what Peter Smith calls the “Age of Uncertainty.”277 For the 
most part he is right. U.S. policy post-Cold War as been an ad hoc one, sometimes 
focusing on drugs like in Colombia, or turmoil and refugee problems like in Haiti. 
Without the unifying force of security concerns, policy is left up to individual lobbies and 
interests. Some fight for economic advantages, while other fight for human rights. 
Without a nation like Imperial Germany or the Soviet Union to challenge us, other 
motives will shape our policy. Hopefully, the United States will seek to use its power to 
promote democracy and prosperity for all, rather than succumb to the temptations of 
power and empire. Only time will tell.
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